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RECENT CASE NOTES
Administration of Estates - Jurisdiction of Probate
Court - Independent Executors
Testator devised a tract of land to his heirs and appointed P independent executor of his estate, but without express authority to sell
or lease the tract. Since oil wells located on adjoining tracts were
draining the reservoir under the tract in question (reported in the
record but not in the opinion), P executed an oil and gas lease
thereon. Subsequently, a devisee executed an oil and gas lease covering the same tract to another party. P then filed an application in
the probate court for authority to execute the lease. Held: The probate court has no jurisdiction to grant the application of an independent executor for authority to execute an oil and gas lease. Marshall v. Hobert Estate, 315 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958)

error ref.
A testator has long been empowered to establish an independent
administration of his estate, see 2 GAMMELL, LAWS OF TEXAS 834
(1843), by providing in his will that no action shall be had in the
county court in relation to the settlement of his estate other than the
probating and recording of his will, TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 145
(1956); see Laney v. Cline, 150 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941)
error dism. judgm. corr. An independent executor traditionally is
permitted to exercise broad powers on the theory that the testator has
exercised his choice as to the person in whom he wishes to confide the
settlement of his estate. Roy v. Whitaker, 92 Tex. 346, 48 S.W. 892,
49 S.W. 367 (1898) ; Basye, Streamlining Administration Under the
New Texas Probate Code, 35 TEXAS L. REV. 165, 181 (1956). Consequently, after he qualifies, an independent executor is generally
considered outside the jurisdiction of the probate court while engaged
in the settlement of the estate, TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 145-46
(1956), unless there is a statutory exception permitting the court to
assume jurisdiction, see, e.g., TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 147, 149-52

(1956).
The early case of Roy v. Whitaker, supra, construing a statute
identical to the present code provision, TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 145
(1956), established the proposition that jurisdiction over independent executors is withdrawn from the court only in those activities
pertaining to the settlement of the estate, i.e., the payment of debts
and the distribution of remaining assets. See Rowland v. Moore, 141
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Tex. 469, 174 S.W.2d 248 (1943). Thus, the court implied that
potential jurisdiction remained as to acts which are not properly
classified as part of the settlement. Jurisdiction remained to accept
the executor's resignation, Roy v. Whitaker, supra; to set aside a provision of the will, Prather v. McClelland, 76 Tex. 574, 13 S.W. 543
(1890); Mason &.Mason v. Brown, 182 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Civ. App.
1944) error ref. w.o.m.; to approve a final account filed with a proper application for partition, Shiner v. Shiner, 90 Tex. 414, 38 S.W.
1126 (1897); or to authorize distribution of the estate, Rowland v.
Moore, supra.
The execution of an oil and gas lease under the circumstances of
the principal case does not appear to be an act performed in the
settlement of an estate; more correctly, it would seem to be an act
done for the preservation of the estate. See First State Bank v. Roach,
124 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1941). Seemingly, under the Roy case, an
assumption of jurisdiction could have been based on this distinction,
but that case was not mentioned by the court. Instead, the case was
decided on an interpretation of the then applicable statutes and
subsequent amendments. Section 367(b) of the Probate Code gives
the court jurisdiction over "personal representatives" of an estate
for the purpose of authorizing the execution of an oil and gas lease,
and "personal representatives" is defined by § 3 (aa) to include independent executors. However, § 367(b) casts doubt on an otherwise clear meaning of this section by restricting its application to
personal representatives "acting solely under orders of court." See
Woodward, Independent Administrations Under the New Texas Probate Code, 34 TEXAS L. REV. 687, 690 (1956). Based on these words
of limitation, the court held § 367 of the Probate Code inapplicable
to independent executors, thereby leaving the probate court without
express jurisdiction to authorize such persons to execute an oil and
gas lease. 315 S.W.2d at 607. This holding is apparently in accord
with the legislative intent expressed in a subsequent code amendment
which provides that where an estate is represented by an independent
executor, no action of any nature may be had in the court except
where permitted by other provisions of the code. TEx. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 145 (Supp. 1958). Since jurisdiction was thus denied, the
court did not reach the question of whether or not an independent
executor is empowered to execute oil and gas leases. However, the
importance of the decision will no doubt be found in its impact on
such transactions. As a general rule, an independent executor may
perform those acts in relation to the settlement of an estate without
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court sanction that a court appointed representative could do with
court authority. SIMKINS, ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN TEXAS
§ 134 (3d ed. 1934). Thus, if such a lease is held to be an act in the
settlement of an estate (a question yet undecided), it seems clear
that the independent executor has the authority under the general
rule previously mentioned to execute a lease independent of the
court, because the Probate Code expressly authorizes such transactions by court appointed representatives. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 367 (1956); Woodward, supra at 689. Conversely, if a subsequent
case holds the execution of an oil and gas lease is not a function in
the settlement of an estate, the principal case (and the recent amendment to § 145 of the Probate Code) by refusing jurisdiction over
an independent executor will have the effect of precluding such
transactions by the testator's selected representative, overruling any
argument which could be made to the contrary as a result of the case
of Roy v. Whitaker, supra.
The only certain method of determining whether an oil and gas
lease is executed pursuant to the settlement function is by court
decision of the substantive issues. Because such assurance was precluded by the instant decision, it would appear impractical or unwise for an independent executor to engage in such transactions,
except perhaps by joinder of all the heirs. To do otherwise is to assume the risk of clouding titles and incurring liability for the estate
as well as the independent executor. The impropriety of such a result
is found in the fact that it is just as important in many instances to
preserve an estate as it is to settle it when the possibility of prompt
settlement seems remote. The desirability of permitting independent
executors to execute oil and gas leases to prevent drainage seems
clear; the instant case emphasizes the need for legislation expressly
permitting them to do so, preferably with court sanction.
Richard B. Williams

Antitrust -

Fair Trade Acts -

Non-signer Provisions

P, a manufacturer of trade-marked products, brought suit pursuant to the Kentucky Fair Trade Act to enjoin D, a retailer, from
selling below the minimum retail prices established by contracts
made with other dealers. P's agreements with these dealers provided
that its products should not be advertised, offered for sale, or sold by
the dealer at less than the minimum retail resale prices stipulated
by P. D was not a party to these contracts but had notice of their

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 13

existence. (The Kentucky Fair Trade Act purported to bind "nonsigners" with knowledge to abide by such contracts.) Held: A "nonsigner" is not bound by fair trade agreements since this provision
of the Kentucky Fair Trade Act is unconstitutional. General Elec.

Co. v. American Buyers Co-op., -Ky.-, 316 S.W.2d 354 (1958).
In the past two decades fair trade laws have become an integral
feature of the national economy, Note, 25 U. CINC. L. REV. 466,
471 (1956), and all but three states (Texas, Missouri, and Vermont)
have enacted these laws. In 1936, the United States Supreme Court
held that resale price maintenance agreements, when authorized by
state law, were legal in intrastate commerce in order to protect a
manufacturer's good will. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. SeagramDistillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936). However, this decision meant
little since the majority of trade-marked commodities were sold in
interstate commerce where vertical price-fixing agreements were

illegal per se. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U.S. 373 (1911). See Rahl, Resale Price Maintenance, State
Action and the Anti-trust Laws, 46 ILL. L. REV. 349, 353 (1951).
Subsequently, Congress made interstate fair trade agreements immune from the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act by passage of the Miller-Tydings Act, 50 STAT. 693
(1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952). In 1951, the Supreme Court held
that the Miller-Tydings Act exempted only interstate consensual
agreements from the prohibitions of the Sherman Act and that the

non-signer provisions of the fair trade laws were unenforceable.
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
This decision prompted the McGuire Act, 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (1952), which validated the "non-signer" provisions of the
typical state act, and federal objections were thus virtually removed
from the scene of controversy. See Miles Laboratories,Inc. v. Eckerd,
73 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1954). The California Fair Trade Act, CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 16900 - 906 (1951), has served as a model for
most of these statutes. They provide, in substance, that a contract
relating to the sale or resale of a commodity which bears a trade
mark or brand name in free and open competition with commodities
of the same general class produced by others is not to be deemed a
violation of any state law because of restrictions upon its sale or resale. Rahl, Resale Price Maintenance, State Action and the Antitrust Laws, 46 ILL. L. REV. 349 (1951). The fair trade laws of some
states authorize the contract to establish a stipulated price for the
commodity, while the laws of other states authorize a minimum
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price to be placed in the fair-trade agreement. See 1 TRADE REG.

REP.
3003 (1955). The "non-signer" provision in the Kentucky
statute provides that whoever knowingly and willfully advertises,
offers for sale, or sells any fair-trade commodity at less than the
minimum price (or in some states at any price other than the stipulated price) stated in any contract entered into between a manufacturer and a retailer, whether or not he is a party to the contract, is
engaged in unfair competition and is liable to any person damaged
thereby. Ky. REV. STAT. § 365.090 (1955).
Out of 45 states with fair trade acts, 15 acts have been declared
unconstitutional, at least insofar as "non-signer" clauses are concerned. See 1 TRADE REG. REP.
3015 (1955). Various reasons
have been assigned for their invalidity under the several state constitutions: (1) the non-signer provision deprives an individual of
his property and liberty without due process of the law, Cox v.
General Elec. Co., 211 Ga. 286, 85 S.E.2d 514 (1955); Dr. G. H.
Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann, 231 La. 51, 90 So. 2d 343
(1956) ; (2) the legislative power of the state is unlawfully delegated
to private individuals since it grants private persons (the manufacturers) the power to fix prices without standards, General Elec. Co.
v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635 (1956); (3) such legislation
bears no real and substantial relation to the public interest and is
therefore beyond the police power of the state, Miles Laboratories,
Inc. v. Eckerd, supra; (4) the non-signer clause is confiscatory and
discriminatory, and such factors cannot be hidden under the guise
of public interest, Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River
Distrib., Inc., 224 Ark. 558, 275 S.W.2d 455 (1955); cf. Mathieson
Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 139 (1956).
Fair trade is a product of the depression. See Herman, A Note
on Fair Trade, 65 YALE L.J. 23 (1955). During this period there
was a belief that "loss-leader" selling and other predatory pricecutting tactics might result in the destruction of the prestige and
good will of trademark manufacturers. It was also feared that large
retailers would force out small retailers in price wars. Schulman, The
Fair Trade Acts, 49 YALE L.J. 607, 616 (1940). Although these
economic and policy reasons may have been influencing factors, the
present court, in declaring the "non-signer" clause unconstitutional,
relied upon two provisions of the Kentucky Constitution. The right
of property includes the right to hold it without unreasonable restriction upon any of its essential attributes, and the right of the
owner to fix the price at which the goods will be sold is an essential
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attribute of the property itself. Ky. CONST. § 1. The court reasons,

therefore, that the people have the right to engage in free trade subject to reasonable regulation, but in order for the regulation to be
reasonable, it must be promulgated in the public interest. Thus,
under the court's interpretation, inasmuch as the non-signer clause
is not in the public interest (since public interest demands free competition) it violates the state constitution. 316 S.W.2d at 361. The
court rejects the reasoning of the Old Dearborn case (that the purpose of the statute is to protect the good will of the manufacturer)
by saying "the over-riding purpose of the statute is to sanction price
fixing." 316 S.W.2d 361. While this may be a realistic perspective,
see Bates, Constitutionality of State Fair Trade Acts, 32 IND. L. REv.
127 (1957), the fact that prices are fixed should not be the sole basis
for invalidation since price fixing may be a legitimate end in itself.

Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934). Although the question of the validity of fair trade
agreements among signers was not directly before the court, by
dictum, it held them constitutional. 316 S.W.2d at 360. This, of
course, will produce substantial inequality in retailing. Those who
have signed the agreements will be bound to their agreements, and
the non-signers immediately will be able to undersell them. As a
practical matter, therefore, the purpose of the statute (to protect
manufacturer's good will) is defeated because the non-signer provision is the "heart" of the statute, Bates, supra at 129.
The court apparently confused the ends and means of the statute.
By upholding fair trade agreements between signers, the court seemingly approved the end of the statute, whether it is price fixing or
protection of a manufacturer's good will. At the same time its attack
upon the non-signer clause is based solely on the end or purpose of
the statute. If the end is justifiable for one clause of the same statute,
it should be justifiable for the other, and the court should have up-

held or invalidated the entire statute. By condemning the non-signer
clause because of its purpose, the court overlooked what may be a
sounder reason for declaring the statute unconstitutional, i.e.,
although the purpose of the statute is valid, it is an unlawful delegation of legislative power to a third person.
Gene L. McCoy
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Antitrust Laws -

Remedies

-

Divestiture

Between 1949 and 1953, boxing promoters Norris and Wirtz obtained exclusive promotion contracts with title contenders in the
heavyweight, middleweight, and welterweight classes. To implement
their effectiveness in controlling championship boxing, they sought
ownership of major boxing arenas and, to this end, acquired controlling stock interest in Madison Square Garden. Through ownership of the Garden and the Chicago Stadium Corporation, and control over the International Boxing Club, they controlled eighty-one
per cent of the championship boxing contests. The federal government instituted suit contending that the activities of Norris and
Wirtz constituted a monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act and
praying, inter alia, that they be required to divest themselves of the
Madison Square Garden stock. Held: Divestiture of the stock is an
appropriate remedy even though absolute necessity of divestiture to
restore competitive conditions is not shown. International Boxing
Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959) (5-3 decision).
Both criminal and civil remedies are available to the Government
in the prosecution of antitrust litigation. Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 4 (1890). However, because the purpose of antitrust litigation is to restore competitive conditions, the criminal
remedy is rarely sought. Berge, Remedies Available to the Government Under the Sherman Act, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 104
(1940). The enforcement of the civil remedy stems from § 4 of the
Sherman Act, which vests equity jurisdiction in the federal district
courts to restrain violations by injunction. United States v. National
Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950). Under this section,
the district court, as a court of equity, has the duty to make the
remedy as effective as possible, United States v. National Lead Co.,
332 U.S. 319 (1947), and, to that end, the court may prohibit acts
which, taken by themselves, do not violate the law, United States v.
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944), and may enjoin
any attempt to realize the proceeds from an agreement tainted by
violation of the antitrust laws, United States v. Bayer Co., 135 F.
Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
The Sherman Act does not expressly authorize divestiture as a
remedy, Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593
(1951), but the power to "prevent" violations has been construed
to permit this relief in appropriate cases, United States v. Great Lakes
Towing Co., 217 Fed. 656 (N.D. Ohio 1914), appeal dism., 245 U.S.
675 (1917). The primary purpose of divestiture is to restore com-

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 13

petitive conditions by requiring defendants (individual or corporate)
to dispose of specific assets or securities. Hartford-Empire Co. v.
United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus.,
105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Divestiture may be ordered
either to end a combination when the combination itself is a violation,
or to deprive the antitrust defendants of the benefit of their conspiracy. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110
(1948). Although divestiture of all illegal property may be required,
United States v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 203 Fed. 295 (S.D. Ohio
1912), property is not to be forfeited if lawful competition exists
which needs only to be released from restraining agreements that
violate antitrust laws, United States v. National Lead Co., supra.
However, if the acquisition is itself unlawful, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948), or common control of
corporations is the instrument making the conspiracy effective,
United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944),
complete divestiture may be the only effective remedy to restore competition, see United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123 (E.D.
Pa. 1943), aff'd, 330 U.S. 806 (1947).
The remedy of divestiture has been characterized as the most
harsh or drastic remedial solution to antitrust litigation. See Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, supra at 603. Accordingly, it
has been stated that divestiture should not be decreed unless it is
absolutely necessary to serve the over-all public interest, Van Cise,
Divestiture as a Remedy Under FederalAntitrust Laws: Limitations
Upon Divestiture, 19 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 147 (1950); see United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 446 (2d Cir. 1945),
and, in fact, divestiture has only been decreed in twenty-four litigated cases since the passage of the Sherman Act, ATr'Y. GEN. NAT'L
COMM. ANTITRUST REP. at 354 (1955). The Court in the principal
case may have changed the requirement of absolute necessity since it
would seem that other means, less drastic, would accomplish the
agreed end of the restoration of competition in the championship
boxing market, e.g., enjoin the voting of the Madison Square Garden
stock. See United States v. Union Pac. R. R., 226 U.S. 61 (1912).
Further, since the district court had permitted a five-year period for
the divestiture to occur, the minority reasoned that divestiture should
at least be stayed for that period to permit Norris and Wirtz to show
a good faith compliance in restoring competitive conditions. However, the majority reasoned that since the individual defendants had
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previously been adjudged to come within the purview of the antitrust laws, United States v. InternationalBoxing Club, 348 U.S. 236
(1955), and had continued controlling championship boxing since
that time, Norris and Wirtz were foreclosed to show a good faith
compliance with the law. Thus the principal case indicates two
theories upon which the decree of divestiture may rest.
The principal case is strong authority for the argument that in
determining the question of reasonableness of a remedy decreed by
the district court in antitrust litigation, the Supreme Court will be
influenced by the conduct of the antitrust defendant in the period
during which he has notice of a possible violation. Further, since
the Government has been successful in the past at proving liability
in antitrust suits, but ineffective in securing meaningful relief, the
requirement of divestiture in the principal case would seem to be an
attempt to make antitrust relief really meaningful. Accordingly, the
requirement that divestiture be ordered only when absolutely necessary may be supplanted by a rule that reasonable necessity for divestiture to restore competitive conditions is sufficient to justify such a
decree. If a reasonableness rule will be applied, the Government now
has an easier task to obtain divestiture relief in antitrust litigation, at
least in cases like the principal case, where the required disposition is
of securities rather than specific assets. However, it may be argued
that divestiture of specific assets involves more problems of feasibility
than divestiture of securities, and therefore the absolute necessity
rule should be applicable to situations involving specific assets. The
answer to this argument is that the feasibility of divestiture is a
factor to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the
remedy. Since application of the rule of reasonableness contemplates
consideration of the feasibility factor, it would seem that there is no
reason to apply a different rule, viz., that of absolute necessity, where
specific assets are involved.
Larry L. Bean

Criminal Law -

Defenses -

Necessity As a Defense

D was convicted of driving an automobile on a public highway
while intoxicated. At the trial D requested the court to instruct the
jury that if he was driving his automobile in search of medical attention for his head injury received at his residence, which attention
was deemed necessary for that purpose, he would not be guilty. The
trial court refused this requested charge. Held: Necessity is not a

SOUTHWESTERN

LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 13

defense in Texas to a criminal prosecution for driving an automobile

on a public highway while intoxicated. Butterfield v. State, -Tex.
Crim.-, 317 S.W.2d 943 (1958).

At common law wherever necessity forces a man to act illegally,
he is justified since one cannot be guilty of a crime without mens rea.
Rex v. Stratton, 21 How. St. Tr. 1045 (1779). An act which otherwise would be a crime may be excused if the accused can show (1)
that it was done only to avoid consequences which could not otherwise be avoided, and which, if they had followed, would have inflicted irreparable evil upon him, or upon others whom he was bound
to protect; (2) that no more was done than was reasonably necessary
for that purpose; and (3) that the act done was not disproportion-

ate to the evil avoided. CLARK &
(6th ed. 1958).

MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES

322

Although dictum in an early American case states

that necessity may justify taking another's life where a duty between two persons does not exist, and the situation was created
by accident, United States v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 360 (No.
15383) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842), it is extremely doubtful today whether
taking another's life is justified where the necessity is not due to
the other's fault, see Arp v. State, 97 Ala. 5, 12 So. 301 (1893);
Brewer v. State, 72 Ark. 145, 78 S.W. 773 (1904); Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, [1884] 14 Q.B.D. 273. The law of self-defense is
based on the theory of necessity, where the necessity relied upon
has not arisen out of one's own misconduct. Dawkins v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 55, 41 S.E.2d 500 (1947). Theft might have been
justified at one time on the theory of necessity, but probably would
not today where one may obtain relief upon application to public
welfare authorities. CLARK & MARSHALL, Op. cit. supra at 323.
Necessity has justified various illegal acts, e.g., joining a rebellion where one's life was endangered in refusing to rebel, Respublica v. McCarty, 2 Dall. 86 (U.S. 1781); mutiny, United States
v. Ashton, 24 Fed. Cas. 873 (No. 14470) (C.C.D. Mass. 1834);
violation of embargo laws because weather forced the vessel to take
refuge in a proscribed port, The William Gray, 29 Fed. Cas. 1300
(No. 17694) (C.C.D. N.Y. 1810); a parent's withdrawal of his
sick child from school without the consent of the school board,
State v. Jackson, 71 N.H. 552, 53 Atl. 1021 (1902) ; stopping one's
vehicle in a public street where he is unavoidably delayed by the
crowding of other vehicles, Commonwealth v. Brooks, 99 Mass. 434
(1868); and reckless driving where it was necessary to escape an
unlawful arrest which threatened serious injury, Browning v. State,
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31 Ala. App. 137, 13 So. 2d 54 (1943). In Texas necessity has been
recognized as a defense only to a violation of the Sunday laws, TEX.
PEN. CODE ANN. art. 284 (1952), and at least in theory in the
laws of self-defense, defense of others, and defense of one's property, see TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. arts. 1221-27 (1948).
Pursuant to article IV, § 13 of the 1836 Constitution of the Republic of Texas, Congress adopted the common law of England, 2
LAWS OF TEXAS 177 (1840). From the date of Texas statehood until the enactment of the Penal Code in 1856, Texas courts followed
the common law of crimes, insofar as not altered by legislative enactment. See State v. Odum, 11 Tex. 12 (1853); Grinder v. State,
2 Tex. 339 (1847). Article 3 of the Penal Code precludes punishment for an act or omission not made penal by the written law of
the state. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 3 (1952). The purpose of
this article was to prevent the prevailing practice in Texas, prior
to the adoption of the Code, of looking to the common law to
prosecute one for a common-law offense which had not been made
penal by the Code. State v. Randle, 41 Tex. 292 (1874); Johnson
v. State, 4 Tex. Crim. 63 (1878). Although article 3 precludes
reference to the common law to convict one of an uncodified offense,
it does not seem to preclude reference to the common law to interpose an uncodified defense. See, e.g., Ferrell v. State, 43 Tex. 503

(1875); Outlaw v. State, 35 Tex. 481 (1871); Payne v. State, 5
Tex. Crim. 35 (1878); Brown v. State, 4 Tex. Crim. 275 (1878);
Colbath v. State, 2 Tex. Crim. 391 (1877), (reference to the common law for the defense of intoxication to offenses requiring a specific intent prior to the enactment of article 36 of the Code relating
to intoxication as a defense).
At the time Texas adopted the common law of England, necessity
as a defense to a criminal prosecution had become established in that
country. See Rex v. Stratton, supra. Unless completely abrogated by
the Texas Penal Code, the common law of crimes and criminal defenses continues to exist to some extent today. Although it is clear
that article 3 of the Code precludes reference to the common law
for the punishment of an act or omission not made an offense by
the Code, cf. State v. Randle, supra, it does not necessarily follow
that article 3 precludes reference to the common law for a defense

not contained in the Code, cf. Ferrell v. State, supra; Payne v. State,
supra. Thus, it would seem that the common-law defense of necessity
would exist in Texas. However, the principal case seems to have
rejected this defense, at least insofar as it is not available to one
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charged with the offense of driving an automobile on a public highway while intoxicated. This result seems to be erroneous in the light
of the above authority.
The court's rejection of the defense of necessity may be based on
the theory that article 3 precludes reference to the common law for
defenses as well as offenses (the court cited no authority in reaching
its decision). However, it is probably more accurate to say that the
court was not apprised of analogous Texas cases regarding commonlaw defenses, viz., intoxication. It would seem that reference to the
common law could be justified not only on legal principle, but also
on a personal sense of justice, e.g., assume D's child, if he had one,
had swallowed a fast acting poison in their home requiring D immediately to drive the child to the hospital to save her life. See 317
S.W.2d at 945 (dissent). In view of these matters not discussed by
the court, this decision should not be considered as a conclusive
rejection of the defense of necessity.
James Weaver Rose

Divorce

-

Domicile

-

Servicemen's Divorce Statutes

H, a serviceman stationed but not domiciled in Texas, brought an
action for divorce against W, domiciled in West Virginia, under
article 4631, TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1958), which
allowed a serviceman's divorce without a showing of domicile. The
district court granted a divorce, and W appealed to the Court of
Civil Appeals, which certified the questions to the Supreme Court.
Held: A serviceman's divorce granted under the Texas statute is
valid in Texas although there is no showing of domicile by the serviceman, and the statute does not deny equal protection of the laws
to the wife. Wood v. Wood, -Tex.-, 320 S.W.2d 807 (1959).
The regulation of marriage and divorce is one of the powers reserved to the several states by the tenth amendment. Williams v.
North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942)
(hereinafter cited as
"Williams I"); Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 15 (1903). Traditionally, jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding is based on domicile,
whether for purposes of full faith and credit, U. S. CONST. art. IV,
§1, Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945) (hereinafter cited as "Williams II") ; Andrews v. Andrews, supra; Bell v.
Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901) ; Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 U.S. 179
(1901); STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 295 (2d ed. 1951);
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS

§§

110-11 (1934), 113 (Supp.
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1948), or for purposes of internal validity, Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 214 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1954) (per curiam), rev'd on
other grounds, 349 U.S. 1 (1955); Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667
(3d Cir. 1953), vacated as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954) ; Jennings v.
Jennings, 251 Ala. 73, 36 So. 2d 236 (1948). The reason for requiring domicile for purposes of jurisdiction is that the domiciliary
state has a primary social interest in the marital relation and should
have the power to dissolve it. STUMBERG, Op. cit. supra at 296; see
also, Williams I, supra at 298; Williams II, supra at 229; Alton v.
Alton, supra; David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, 205 Misc. 836, 129
N.Y.S.2d 649 (1954); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 9,
110 comment a (1934), 113 comment a (Supp. 1948). In order
to be domiciled (by choice) within a state, the person must reside
there with the present intention to make the state his home. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 15-16, 20 (1934). The wife's
domicile is usually the same as that of her husband, Postle v. Postle,
280 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Pippin v. Pippin, 193
S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 27 (1934), although she can acquire a separate domicile if
living apart from her husband is necessary, Atherton v. Atherton,
181 U.S. 155 (1901); Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 108
(1869); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28 (1934).
At present, a divorce proceeding is said to have the characteristics
of an in rem action, i.e., requiring the domicile of only one party,
and if sufficient notice is given to the other party (procedural due
process), it is entitled to full faith and credit. See Williams I, supra
at 298; Atherton v. Atherton, supra; Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R.I. 87
(1856). Whenever the full faith and credit clause is invoked in
another court, the question of jurisdiction (domicile) of the first
court is subject to be reopened. Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949) ;
Williams II, supra at 238; Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562
(1906). The issue of domicile cannot be reopened if the person
questioning jurisdiction (1) appeared or was personally served in
the forum of the first state, Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) ;
Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938), even though the issue of
domicile was not litigated, Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948), or (2)
is in privity with a party who appeared in the first suit, Cook v.
Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581
(1951) (the theory of these holdings is res judicata or estoppel).
There has been language in recent cases indicating that a divorce
decree is to be given full faith and credit even though there is no
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finding of domicile by the decree-granting state. Granville-Smith v.
Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. at 26 (dissent); Williams II, supra at

255-56 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); Craig v. Craig, 143 Kan. 624,
56 P.2d 464 (1936) (dictum); Crownover v. Crownover, 58 N.M.
597, 274 P.2d 127 (1954) (dictum); David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss,
supra (dictum); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 79, comment a at 69 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956) (residence is
sufficient). However, the state must have at least a substantial interest in the marital relation or the requirements of due process will
not be met. Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020
(1958); Wilson v. Wilson, 58 N.M. 411, 272 P.2d 319, 321 (1954);
Wheat v. Wheat, -Ark.-, 318 S.W.2d 793 (1958) (dictum)
(due process as used here means jurisdiction for purposes of conflict
of laws).
In each case that the United States Supreme Court has held domicile to be necessary for jurisdiction for purposes of full faith and
credit, the state statute required domicile for internal validity. See,

e.g., Williams I, supra at 298; Wallace v. Wallace, supra at 1022;
but see Andrews v. Andrews, supra at 41 (dictum). Although
the United States Supreme Court has never decided a case on the
point, it would appear that a divorce decree may be valid internally
even though it is not entitled to full faith and credit in other states.
,Williams I, supra at 299 (dictum); Williams II, supra at 239, 242
(concurring opinion), 244, 246 (Rutledge, J., dissenting), 267-274

(Black, Douglass, JJ., dissenting); Wheat v. Wheat, supra at 796;
Wallace v. Wallace, supra at 1023. A few courts have refused to
take jurisdiction under a statute dispensing with domicile and in
effect have required domicile for internal validity. E.g., Granville-

Smith v. Granville-Smith, supra; Alton v. Alton, supra; Jennings v.
Jennings, supra. These cases are clearly distinguishable from the instant case because they involve "migratory divorces," i.e., statutes
which require only a short-term residence before filing a divorce
petition. Many states, however, have found grounds other than domicile to give them a substantial interest in the marital relationship
which would allow a divorce decree to be internally valid and not
violative of substantive due process, e.g., servicemen's divorce
statutes, Schaeffer v. Schaeffer, 175 Kan. 629, 266 P.2d 282 (1954);
Wallace v. Wallace, supra, and marriage contracted in the decreegranting state, David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, supra. In Texas, the
residence requirement of article 4631 is not jurisdictional for internal
validity, but is a prerequisite to plaintiff's right to sue. Ex parte
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Tyler, 152 Tex. 602, 261 S.W.2d 833 (1953); Roberts v. Roberts,
144 Tex. 603, 192 S.W.2d 774 (1946); Aucutt v. Aucutt, 122 Tex.
518, 62 S.W.2d 77 (1933). Article 4631, which requires a civilian
to be "an actual bona fide inhabitant" for one year immediately
prior to filing a divorce petition, has been interpreted to require a
permanent residence, which is the equivalent of domicile. Smith v.
Smith, 311 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Postle v. Postle,
supra; Green v. Green, 279 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955);
Struble v. Struble, 177 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). These
cases point out that, before the 1957 amendment to article 4631, in
order for a serviceman to change his domicile to Texas, he had to
meet the same requirements of domiciliary intent as a civilian, but
his burden of proof was greater inasmuch as he was required to show
an overt act in addition to showing a present intention to make
Texas his domicile. It was extremely difficult for a serviceman to
prove the intent necessary to acquire a Texas domicile when he was
ordered to a military installation in Texas, because there cannot
be a domicile of choice if there is legal or physical compulsion to do
an act. See Miller v. Miller, 306 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957);

Pippin v. Pippin, supra;

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND),

CONFLICT OF

§ 21, comment d at 79 (Tent. Draft. No. 2, 1954). By
virtue of the 1957 amendment, a serviceman is deemed to be "an
actual bona fide inhabitant" and resident upon proof of one year's
residence on a Texas military installation. Thus the statute dispenses with the necessity of proving domiciliary intent. The instant case is the first in which it has been contended that the wife
is denied equal protection of the law where a servicemen's divorce
statute does not provide that the serviceman's spouse can sue for
divorce under the same conditions. In some states, the language of
LAWS

the statute is sufficiently broad to include the wife. See, e.g., KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1502 (1949); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-4
(1953). The Court rejects this argument and indicates that she
could bring a divorce action had she lived with her husband for
the statutory time, even though she could not show domiciliary intent. The Court reasoned that since her domicile follows that of her
husband, by analogy, her standing to sue under the Texas servicemen's statute would also follow him if he qualified under the statutory requirements. 320 S.W.2d at 812.
Although the Texas servicemen's divorce statute apparently does
not require domicile of a serviceman in order for him to obtain a
divorce, it seems apparent that the Texas Court is of the opinion
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that a year's residence in Texas gives the state a substantial interest
which is sufficient to entitle a divorce decree to recognition under
the full faith and credit clause. While the Court's statement that
the decree is entitled to full faith and credit is dictum, it is significant when compared with the growing number of courts which
have made such statements. Furthermore, it must be remembered
that the Texas statute is not to be placed in the same class as the
"quickie divorce" statutes which have been widely condemned. Because the serviceman's position in acquiring a technical domicile is
unique, it would seem only equitable that a divorce obtained under
a statute such as this should be given full faith and credit, regardless
of whether or not it is ex parte in nature. The writer believes that
the strict requirements of domicile for purposes of divorce jurisdiction are an outmoded requirement of the common law, and should
be replaced by a reasonable requirement of residence (long enough
to give the state a substantial interest in the marriage) as prescribed
by the statutes of the decree-granting state.

Cecil A. Ray, Jr.

Insurance

-

Act

Texas Safety-Responsibility
-

Self-insurance

P insurance company issued a standard policy of automobile
liability insurance on the personal car of Cole, an employee of D
corporation. The policy included coverage on any other car driven
by Cole to the extent such car was not covered by "other valid and
collectible insurance." D had qualified as a "self-insurer" under the
Texas Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act. While driving one
of D's cars with permission, but on a personal mission, Cole negligently damaged a house and injured its occupant. This suit was
brought to determine whether P or D was legally liable for the damages. Held: A company's certificate of self-insurance does not constitute "other valid and collectible insurance" within the meaning
of an excess-coverage provision in a standard policy issued on the
personal car of an employee of the self-insured company, and when
that employee negligently causes damages with a car owned by the
self-insured company, the standard-policy insurer is primarily liable

for such damages. Home Indem. Co. v. Humble Oil and Ref. Co.,
314 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e.
The Texas Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act, TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701(h) (Supp. 1958), provides several al-
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ternate ways for the required proving of financial responsibility of
owners or operators of vehicles negligently driven and causing damages to the public. Section 34 of the act allows owners of more than
twenty-five vehicles to obtain certificates of self-insurance from the
Department of Public Safety when the department is satisfied that
the owner has the ability to pay judgments arising out of the ownership or operation of the vehicles. This certificate relieves the selfinsurer from paying regular insurance premiums on its vehicles.
Sections 18(4) and 21(b) (2) provide that the self-insurer agrees
with the state that he will pay the same judgments and in the same
amounts that a regular insurer would have been obligated to pay on
behalf of the insured or any other person using the vehicle with the
permission of the insured if the regular insurer had issued an owner's motor vehicle liability policy to the self-insurer.
Considered alone, section 34 would seem to serve merely as an
exemption of financially responsible owners of more than twentyfive vehicles from the sanctions of the act. See generally, Assoc. of
Cas. and Sur. Cos., Automobile Liability Security Laws of the U. S.
and Canada (6th ed. 1953); Comment, 12 Sw. L.J. 218 (1958). If
only an exemption, recovery against the self-insurer would be possible only if he would be liable as a principal under traditional rules
of agency. Interpretation of the act is not difficult as long as a
negligent driver is the agent of the self-insurer and is acting within
the scope of his authority, for the common-law rules would apply
to make the principal liable even in the absence of the statute. See
Brown v. City Serv. Co., 245 S.W. 656 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922);
Gordon v. Tex. & Pac. Mercantile & Mfg. Co., 190 S.W. 748 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1916). The difficulty of interpretation arises when, as
in the instant case, the agent is acting outside the scope of his
employment; the difficulty is compounded when the agent carries
liability insurance on his personal car which includes coverage while
using "other cars" to the extent that such "other cars" are not
covered by "other valid and collectible insurance." The essential
question is, then, whether a certificate of self-insurance held by an
employer constitutes "other valid and collectible insurance" within
the meaning of the excess-coverage provision contained in the policy
of liability insurance issued on the personal car of an employee of the
self-insurer.
In answering this question negatively, the court in the instant case
reasons that since a negligent employee is primarily liable as a tortfeasor and the self-insured employer is only secondarily liable, the
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employer could have recovered over against the employee for any
sum which it might pay in his behalf. Conversely, the employee
could not sustain a suit against his employer for recoupment of damages paid by him in satisfaction of a judgment rendered against him
for his own primarily negligent act, and, therefore, the employee's
private insurer, standing in his shoes, cannot recover against the selfinsured employer. 314 S.W.2d at 865. The basis for this conclusion
is said to lie in the fact that the legislature did not intend a selfinsurer to assume the same obligations which arise under a standard
policy of automobile liability insurance, particularly that obligation
of indemnifying its employee against loss caused by his own negligence occuring outside the scope of his employment. 314 S.W.2d at
865-66. In analyzing this holding and the defenses raised by the
self-insurer, it is significant that elsewhere it has been held that no
defense can be set up by the insurer which would defeat the statutory
object of a public liability act. Malmgren v. Southwestern Auto
Ins. Co., 201 Cal. 29, 255 Pac. 512 (1927); Annot., 85 A.L.R. 20
(1933). Section 21(b) (2) (f) (1) of the Texas act appears to
follow this rule. The court, in accepting these defenses, however,
seems to ignore this and several significant implications of the act.
First, the act indicates that a self-insurer plays two roles, viz., that
of an employer of the negligent employee and that of insurer of himself and any other person driving the vehicle with his permission.
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701(h), §§ 18(4), 21(b)(2).
Thus interpreted, the act places liability on the self-insurer, as an
insurer, to pay judgments against its negligent employee; the common-law rule of agency restricting the liability of a principal to the
scope of the agent's duties becomes immaterial, as do any tort-law
distinctions between "primary" and "secondary" liability. It is a
basic principle of public liability insurance law that the policy insures anyone operating the insured's vehicle with the permission of
the named insured. CURRY, GENERAL INSURANCE FOR TEXAS 77
(1955); see Snyder v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 191 S.W.2d 107
(Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref. w.o.m.; Salitrero v. Maryland Cas.
Co., 109 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error ref.; Annot.,
5 A.L.R.2d 600, 637-38 (1949). Thus, the basis of the self-insurer's
liability under the act is that of ownership of the vehicle driven by
anyone having the permission of the owner, rather than any agency
relationship existing between the driver and the owner of the vehicle.
Illustrating the logical inconsistency of the court's decision, if any
company carried an ordinary public liability policy on its vehicle,
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the insurance carrier would be liable to a third party injured by
the negligence of anyone, including employees, who drove the vehicle
with the insured owner's permission. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
6701 (h), § 21 (b) (2); CURRY, op. cit. supra. If a self-insurer must
pay the same judgments as a regular insurance carrier in these circumstances, as section 18 (4) stipulates, then it follows that the self-

insurer also would be liable. Secondly, regular liability insurance
makes the insurer liable to any third party by indemnifying the
negligent driver or owner, when the terms of the policy create a
primary insurance liability on the part of the insurer in favor of
the third party, Kuntze v. Spence, 67 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1934); Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Shudde, 76 S.W.2d
561 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), and the third party may bring suit by
joinder against the insurer directly, even though the driver is liable
in tort and the insurer's liability is based on contract, Scroggs v.
Morgan, 107 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), rev'd on other
grounds, 133 Tex. 581, 130 S.W.2d 283; Commercial Standard Ins.
Co. v. Philpot, 82 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Annot., 20
A.L.R.2d 1097, 1100, 1112 (1951). Thus, since ordinary public
liability insurance makes the insurer primarily liable to the public,
it is not necessary that a policy inure to the benefit of, or be collectible by, the one who drives the vehicle with permission. Since
self-insurance likewise makes the self-insurer primarily liable to the
public (as the court concedes, 314 S.W.2d at 865) it certainly does
not seem that such insurance must inure to the benefit of, or be
collectible by, the one who drives the vehicle with permission, as
the court insists in the instant case.
If the decision in the instant case is applied to its logical extreme,
injured plaintiffs will not recover from self-insurers unless such "employers" would be liable at common law. It is difficult to conceive
that the legislature contemplated such a result. To be sure, even if
the case is not extended that far, the practical result could be to
shift the payment of judgments from the self-insurer to the insurance companies by the simple expedient of requiring all employees
to have excess-coverage endorsements in their policies on their personal cars, with the public at large sharing the burden in increased
insurance rates.
Ray Besing
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Significance of

During one term of a district court, P brought suit seeking a

judgment declaring rights to the use of a certain street. The jury
returned a verdict in favor of D, and both parties filed motions for
judgment on the verdict and judgment non obstante veredicto. By
the end of the second term the court had not rendered judgment.
During the third term, however, the district judge signed a judgment in favor of D. On appeal, P claimed that the judgment was
void because rendered and entered in the second term after the term
in which the verdict was returned in violation of rule 330 (j). Held:
A judgment of a district court which is rendered and entered after
the close of the second term in which a trial has been in process is
authorized by rule 330(j) and is not void. Couch v. City of Richardson, 313 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e.
Ordinarily, a trial in process during one term of court must be
completed within that term, for expiration of term time results in
a loss of power, and further proceedings become a nullity. 1
MCDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE 111 (1950). However, a wellsettled exception exists in Texas that a trial court possesses power
both to render and to enter a judgment nunc pro tunc (now for
then) after term time where, at the end of the term, (1) the jury
has returned a verdict clearly in favor of one of the parties, (2)
the case is ripe for judgment, and (3) the delay in rendering judgment at the proper time is the fault of the court. Williams v.
Wyrick, 151 Tex. 40, 245 S.W.2d 961 (1952); Gulf, C. eS.F. Ry.
v. Canty, 115 Tex. 537, 285 S.W. 296 (1926); accord, Wright v.
Longhorn Drilling Corp., 202 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947)
error ref. The rule is based on the principle that an unambiguous
verdict is res judicata as to the parties until set aside, or a new trial
is granted, or judgment n.o.v. is rendered, Hume v. Schintz, 91 Tex.
204, 42 S.W. 543 (1897), and rendering judgment thereon is a
ministerial act which may be done by a judgment nunc pro tunc
after term time, Williams v. Wyrick, supra. Theoretically, judgment nunc pro tunc is the only proper judgment which may be
rendered on the verdict after the court loses power over the trial,
see 1 MCDONALD, op. cit. supra; cf. Wright v. Longhorn Drilling
Corp., supra, and may be used on either the court's own motion or
the motion of the party seeking judgment on the verdict, Nalle v.
Walenta, 102 S.W.2d 1070 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
By recent amendment all district courts in Texas have continuous
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terms, TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1919(1) (1958 Supp.), i.e.,
successive terms without more than two days intervening between
them, TEX. R. Crv. P. 330 (1955). Rule 330 (j) provides that where
a case is on trial when the term of court expires, the trial may proceed into the next term of court. No special procedure need be
followed to proceed into the next term. Shellhammer v. Caruthers,
99 S.W.2d 1054 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) error dism. It has been
held, however, that rule 330(j) does not automatically extend the
second or subsequent terms, and any proceeding thereafter is void.
British Gen. Ins. Co. v. Ripy, 130 Tex. 101, 106 S.W.2d 1047
(1937); Turner v. Texas Sportservice, Inc., 312 S.W.2d 388 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e.; Pelham v. Sanders, 290 S.W.2d
684 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Coats v. Garrett, 283 S.W.2d 289
(Tex. Civ. App. 1955); see Collier, The Special Practice Act, 6 Sw.
L.J. 193 (1952) (author critical of rule). Consequently, it has been
held that for a district court to retain power over a trial in process
after the close of the second term, an order extending that term
must be made by the presiding judge in accordance with article
1923, TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1923 (1949), Jones v. Jimmerson, 302 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref. n.r.e.
(eight extension orders) ; British Gen. Ins. Co. v. Ripy, 130 Tex.
101, 104, 106 S.W.2d 1047, 1048 (1937) (dictum), unless the
court reacquires jurisdiction over the trial in the third term by the
express or implied consent of the parties, Shaw & Estes v. Texas
Consol. Oil Corp., 299 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref.

n.r.e.
The court in the principal case declined to follow British Gen. Ins.
Co. v. Ripy, supra, stating that the Supreme Court impliedly overruled that case in Williams v. Wyrick, supra. While it is true that
the Supreme Court in the Williams case (which was concerned with
entry of a nunc pro tunc judgment after term time) questioned the
holding of the Ripy case, later civil appeals decisions have expressly
followed the Ripy case. See, e.g., Turner v. Texas Sportservice, Inc.,

supra; Pelham v. Sanders, supra; Coats v. Garrett, supra. These
cases were concerned with the attempted exercise by the court of
certain discretionary acts after the second term had expired, viz.,
taking the case under advisement and rendering judgment n.o.v.
Hence, it would seem questionable to conclude that the Ripy case
has been overruled in all respects. However, the Williams case does
seem to overrule the Ripy case insofar as that case would consider
the exercise of ministerial acts after term time void, such as the
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rendition and entry of a judgment nunc pro tunc. Thus, the trial
court in the instant case could have avoided the problem by the
simple expedient of rendering and entering a judgment nunc pro
tunc on its own motion (as the issues were apparently answered

conclusively for D). Cf. Williams v. Wyrick, supra; Nalle v.
Walenta, supra. However, inasmuch as the trial court entered only
what purports to be an ordinary judgment, the principal case seems
to be in direct conflict with the Ripy case and subsequent decisions.
Notwithstanding the holding of the principal case, it appears
that the interpretation of rule 330 (j) by the Ripy case to some extent is still the law, at least insofar as the court without an extension order lacks power after expiration of the second term to exercise
those discretionary acts involved in the Turner and Garrett cases.
However, the holding of the principal case seems desirable, for it
represents the trend away from the stringent rule of the Ripy case.
If the rule of the principal case is followed, district courts should
never be confronted with the problem of loss of power over a trial
when the second or subsequent terms expire. This probably was the
true purpose of rule 330(j). However, because the holdings of the
principal case and Shaw &q Estes v. Texas Consol. Oil Corp., supra,
seem to be in direct conflict with the Ripy case and subsequent decisions, clarification by the Supreme Court of the full significance of
term time in district courts is needed. Until this is done, a caveat
should be given to the lawyer who, in relying on the principal case,
permits his case to proceed into a third term; when it becomes apparent that the case will not be completed within two terms, he
should, to be safe, request the presiding judge to extend the second
term for the purpose of concluding the trial in accordance with
article 1923.

James Weaver Rose

Municipal Corporations Immunity From Tort
Liability - Assertion To Bar Recoupment
P was a municipally owned and operated hospital. D entered the
hospital for a routine physical examination. P's employees negligently
failed to discover that D's hip was fractured. D was subsequently
confined in the hospital for approximately one year, the confinement
period being lengthened by reason of P's negligence. P brought suit
to recover for its services, and D sought to counterclaim in tort for
P's negligence. Held: A municipal corporation may assert its im-
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munity from tort liability to preclude the interposition of a tort
counterclaim but not to bar a recoupment plea which sounds in tort.
Mullins Hospital v. Squires, -S.C.-, 104 S.E.2d 161 (1958).
In the performance of its governmental functions, a municipality
stands as the state and thus shares the state's immunity from tort
liability, City of Fort Worth v. Wiggins, 5 S.W.2d 761 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1928); 18 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §
53.01 (3d ed. 1951), which stems from the ancient maxim "the
King can do no wrong," Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort,
36 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 221 (1926). The municipality is not immune
for torts of its employees committed in the exercise of proprietary
functions. Scroggins v. City of Harlingen, 148 Tex. 193, 112 S.W.2d
1035 (1938); 18 MCQUILLIN, Op. cit. supra at § 53.01. It is settled
that certain functions are governmental, e.g., the establishment and
maintenance of public schools, Campbell v. Hillsboro School Dist.,
203 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), and the operation of a fire
department, Kling v. City of Austin, 62 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933), but that others are proprietary, e.g., the operation of a bus
system, Crowley v. City of Monroe, 26 So. 2d 493 (La. App. 1946),
and the operation of a water works, City of Wichita Falls v. Lipscomb, 50 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). However, there is disagreement as to the status of still other functions, e.g., the construction and maintenance of streets,City of Texarkana v. Rhyne, 126 Tex.
77,86 S.W.2d 215 (1935) (proprietary); Bates v. Village of Rutland,
62 Vt. 178, 20 Atl. 278 (1890) (governmental), and the maintenance of parks and playgrounds, City of Waco v. Branch, 117 Tex.
394, 5 S.W.2d 498 (1928) (proprietary); Russell v. City of Tacoma,
8 Wash. 146, 35 Pac. 605 (1894) (governmental). See generally 18
MCQUILLIN, Op. cit. supra at §§ 53.23-53.59. As to paying patients,
some courts hold that the operation of a hospital is a proprietary
function, see, e.g., Nathenson v. N.Y., 282 N.Y. 556, 24 N.E.2d 983
(1939), but a strong majority, including Texas, classifies this function as governmental, City of Dallas v. Smith, 130 Tex. 225, 107
S.W.2d 872 (1937); Gartman v. City of McAllen, 130 Tex. 237,
107 S.W.2d 879 (1937); Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 203 (1952). South
Carolina, the state of the instant case, regards all municipal functions
as governmental. Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S.C. 511, 72 S.E.
228 (1911).
Sovereign immunity is commonly invoked by a municipality as a
defense to a direct tort action. See, e.g., Kling v. City of Austin, supra.
Less frequently is the doctrine employed to bar defensive matter. A
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few courts permit the municipality to plead its immunity as a bar
to the defense of contributory negligence, see, e.g., Miller v. Layton,
133 N.J.L. 323, 44 A.2d 177 (1945), but the predominant view is
that contributory negligence may be raised, Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 827
(1948); see, e.g., City of Baraboo v. Excelsior Creamery Co., 171
Wis. 242, 177 N.W. 36 (1920). The majority view is based on the
theory that the municipality's institution of suit constitutes a limited
waiver of its immunity, the effect of which is to permit the defendant to plead any appropriate defense touching the merits of the
sovereign's claim. Cf. United States v. Moscow-Idaho Seed Co., 92
F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1937); Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 827 (1948).
The court in the principal case reasoned that a plea in recoupment
is a defense, and hence the municipality could not avail itself of its
immunity to defeat the plea. 161 S.E.2d at 167. At the early common law, recoupment was similar to the defense of satisfaction, i.e.,
in a contract action, the defendant might recoup or reduce the
plaintiff's recovery by showing payment or prior recovery. See Loyd,
The Development of Set-Off, 64 U. OF PA. L. REV. 541 (1916).
However, under modern rules of pleading, facts which might found
an independent cause of action in favor of the defendant may be
pleaded by way of recoupment if they arise out of the transaction
sued upon. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 100 (2d ed. 1947). Thus,
although the courts frequently speak of recoupment as a "defense,"
see, e.g., Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1934); In re Monongahela Rye Liquors, 141 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1944), the plea is generally
defensive only in the sense that it reduces the plaintiff's recovery
and not in the sense that it goes to the merits of the plaintiff's claim.
See POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES § 609 (5th ed. 1929). As the waiver

of the municipality's tort immunity (implied from its institution of
suit) is to permit the interposition of defenses which touch the merits
of its claim, United States v. Moscow-Idaho Seed Co., supra, the decision in the instant case would seem insupportable in the absence of
an expansion of the waiver doctrine. Although the principal case was
not expressly decided on a broadening of the doctrine, this seems the
logical answer to the court's holding. The extent of the expansion,
however, is somewhat uncertain. It is implicit in the holding that by
bringing suit the city does not waive its immunity entirely with respect to the subject matter of the litigation, since D was not permitted to counterclaim and thus to recover an affirmative judgment
against the municipality. While the principal case apparently holds
that the municipality's institution of suit will always waive its right
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to plead its immunity in bar of a tort recoupment plea, it is questionable whether the holding will be interpreted to permit recoupment in a dissimilar fact situation. In the instant case, the performance of a portion of the services for -which the city sued would not
have been necessary if the city had not been negligent. The court
indicated that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the city to
recover for the rendition of those services which its own negligence
necessitated. 161 S.E.2d at 166-67. Had D been confined in the hospital for one year before being injured by the negligence of a hospital employee, perhaps recoupment for damages resulting from the
injury would have been denied in a suit by the city to recover for
services rendered prior to the negligent act.
While the principal case is indicative of the tendency to restrict the
application of sovereign immunity, the extent of the restriction which
it imposes cannot be precisely determined. The broad language of the
opinion suggests that the rule of the case will be applied to permit
recoupment in tort against a municipal corporation whenever the
procedural requisites for recoupment are met. However, the possibility that the holding will be restricted to similar fact situations should
serve as a caveat to one who would conclude from a casual reading
of the case that its holding will be given general application.
Lester V. Baum

Procedure -

Actions -

Arising From

A Single Occurrence
P sustained injuries both to his property and person in a collision
with D's truck. P instituted the present suit to recover for damage
to his automobile, and D contended that P's recovery for personal
injuries in a prior suit was a bar to this action for damage to property. Held: A single wrongful or negligent act that causes both
personal injury and property damage to one individual constitutes
only one cause of action with separate items of damage; judgment
for damages based on either item may be pleaded in bar to an action
to recover for the other. Cormier v. Highway Trucking Co., 312
S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
The various definitions of "cause of action" by the text writers
and courts have been numerous and discordant. See Harris, What
Is A Cause Of Action, 16 CALIF. L. REv. 459 (1927). At common
law, a cause of action was founded upon three elements: (1) a
primary right or interest in one party, (2) a corresponding duty
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on the part of the other, and (3) a breach of this duty by the other
to the injury or damage of the party who possessed the primary
right. SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING 77 (3d ed. 1923). These
common-law elements have, in effect, been adopted by a large body

of Texas case law. See, e.g., Phoenix Lumber Co. v. Houston Water
Co., 94 Tex. 456, 61 S.W. 707 (1901); Phillio v. Blythe, 12 Tex.
124, 127 (1854). The Texas rule (at least prior to the principal
case) perhaps may be summarized with the statement "that an entire
cause of action should consist of facts showing a single substantive
right, together with a breach or threatened violation of that substantive right, and, where necessary for recovery according to the
substantive law, the consequent damages." Keeton, Theory of the
Action in Texas, 11 TEXAS L. REV. 145 (1933). This "technical"
definition is not without recognized critics who feel that the term
should have a non-technical or lay definition, viz., it is that aggregate of operative facts which gives rise to one or more legal relations
of right-duty enforceable in the courts. Clark, The Code Cause Of
Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817, 828 (1924). Under either view, the
pleadings must be phrased to include both the operative facts and
the rights violated; the only difference is that the former definition
determines if there is a violation of a substantive right, while the
latter finds its basis in the facts causing the violation. Compare Watson v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 27 S.W. 924 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894) with

Fields v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 273 Pa. 282, 117 Atl. 59
(1922).

Inasmuch as judicial precedent in each jurisdiction has established
the elements usually necessary to be pleaded in the major areas of
the law, see, e.g., TEX. R. Civ. P. ANN. 45 (1955), the importance
of a theoretical definition of "cause of action" has largely subsided.
It is only in determining whether more than one cause of action
arises from a particular set of facts that the "theory behind the rule"
remains of great significance. See Keeton, Theory of the Action in
Texas, supra. Where a single wrongful act results in injury both
to the person and to property, the question arises whether or not a
recovery for one element may be pleaded in bar to a suit for recovery
of the other. See Annot., 127 A.L.R. 1081 (1940). The majority
of courts adopts the non-technical definition of "cause of action";
therefore, since the operative facts consist of but one wrongful act,
only one cause of action may arise, even though more than one substantive right is violated. Dearden v. Hey, 304 Mass. 659, 24 N.E.2d
644 (1939); Sprague v. Adams, 139 Wash. 510, 247 Pac. 960
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(1926). The view has been expressed that the majority rule actually is based on the policy of avoiding multiple law suits where one

will suffice. Clark, Joinder and Splitting of Causes of Action, 25
MIcH. L. REV. 393, 428 (1927) ; Wilson, Writs v. Rights, 18 MIcH.
L. REV. 255 (1920). A minority of courts adopt the common-law
or technical definition of "cause of action"; thus, when two separate
and distinct substantive rights are invaded, e.g., damage both to
person and to property, two causes of action arise although but one
transaction is involved. Ochs v. Public Service Ry., 81 N.J.L. 661,
80 Atl. 495 (1911); Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt Paving Co., 17 N.Y.
40, 62 N.E. 772 (1902).
The court in the instant case recognized but distinguished two
earlier cases, Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Nelson, 29 S.W. 78 (Tex. Civ.

App. 1894) error ref. and Watson v. Texas & Pac. Ry., supra, which
have previously been thought to commit Texas to the minority view.
See Davis v. Clayton, 214 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (dictum); Keeton, Theory of the Action in Texas, supra; 1 TEX. JUR.
Actions § 857 (1929). The basis of the court's distinction is not
apparent to the writer. Nevertheless, the court in the principal case
treated this problem as one of first impression, 312 S.W.2d at 407,
and adopted the majority view in order to further public policy by
avoiding multiplicity of suits, 312 S.W.2d at 407. The majority and
minority views are both adequately supported by recognized textual writers and courts, and both views present certain problems.
Aside from the practical difficulty of determining when more than
one substantive right has been violated, the minority rule has the
effect of permitting undesirable multiple suits where, in many instances, one will suffice. Clark, The Code Cause of Action, supra.
The majority rule, on the other hand, in finding its basis in the
operative facts (e.g., a violation of a single duty of reasonable care,
Underwood v. Dooley, 197 N.C. 100, 147 S.E. 686 (1922)) was developed solely for the purpose of preventing such multiplicity. Harris, Writs v. Rights, supra. This practice presents problems of its own
when the element of insurance is injected into the usual action for
negligence. In Sprague v. Adams, supra, plaintiff carried casualty
insurance on his automobile. Defendant negligently injured plaintiff's person and caused damage to the car, and the insurer, after
paying plaintiff for his property damage, sued the defendant and
recovered through an insurer's right of subrogation. In plaintiff's
later suit for personal injuries, the Washington court held the prior
recovery for property damage by the insurance company barred the
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suit for personal injuries. Contra, Underwood, v. Dooley, supra;
Underwritersat Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Vicksburg Traction Co., 106 Miss.
244, 63 So. 455 (1913) (holding the majority rule has no application when separate suits are not prosecuted by the same plaintiff).
Thus, plaintiff unknowingly sacrificed a possibly larger claim for
personal injuries for the sake of a small claim for property damage.
Without elaboration, the court in the principal case expressed the
opinion that "there are exceptions" to the rule it announced. 312
S.W.2d at 407. It may be argued that by this language, the court
intended to except from its rule the insured-insurer fact situation
of Sprague v. Adams, supra. Nevertheless, the court's pronouncement calls for future litigation with respect to this problem.
It is believed that although the decision in the instant case creates
a conflict in the civil appeals courts in Texas, the result of the case
is desirable and that it will be followed in preference to the older
cases adopting the minority view. As the technical arguments advanced in support of the majority view (that the operative facts
determine the cause of action) and the minority view (that the
number of substantive rights involved are controlling) are now
largely academic, the practical effects of the two should be the
predominate considerations. Thus, inasmuch as it is desirable that
claims be settled expeditiously with the least possible cost to all parties, the rule of the principal case is sound. Its practical value is questionable, however, when the facts change to include an insurerinsured relationship. In this instance, if the rule of the principal
case is applied consistently, an uninformed insured may be deprived
of a just claim, a result surely not contemplated by a rule of convenience.
William M. Ravkind

Procedure -

Summary Judgments
Parties and Issues

-

"Severable"

In a libel action, Ds moved for and were granted summary judgment "subject to" their cross action. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals dismissed P's appeal because the Ds' cross action was still pending. On motion for rehearing, P contended that the summary judgment was final and appealable because the cross action was "sever-

able." Held: A judgment is appealable only when it disposes of all
parties and issues or some independent severed interest, issue, or right.
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Browning v. Gomez, 315 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error
dism.
In a suit where there is no genuine issue of fact, or where some,
but not all, issues of fact are undisputed, any party to the suit is
entitled to move for summary judgment upon all or any part of the
case. TEX. R. Civ. P. ANN. 166-A (1955); McDonald, Summary
Judgments, 30 TEXAS L. REV. 285, 286-93 (1952). Thereupon, the
trial court may (1) grant a summary judgment on the entire case,
(2) deny the motion for summary judgment altogether, or (3)
grant a "partial summary judgment" where relief is asked on less
than the whole case, or where a motion for summary judgment on
the entire case should be granted in part only. 4 McDONALD, TEXAS
CIVIL PRACTICE, § 17.26.1 (Supp. 1958). When the unsuccessful
movant for summary judgment or the party against whom summary
judgment was granted desires to appeal in each of these instances, he
is confronted with the rule that appellate jurisdiction can be invoked
only after a trial which results in a "final" judgment, Davis v. McRay
Refrigerator Sales Corp., 136 Tex. 296, 150 S.W.2d 377 (1941);
Morrow v. Corwin, 122 Tex. 533, 62 S.W.2d 641 (1933); Hart,
The Appellate Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court of Texas, 29 TExAs
L. REV. 285, 301-04 (1951), unless specially excepted in certain
cases, see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 2008, 2250-51 (1950).
Further, there may be but one final judgment in any cause unless
specifically provided otherwise. TEX. R. Civ. P. ANN. 301 (1955);
Taylor v. Masterson, 231 S.W. 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921). A final
judgment is defined as one which purports to dispose, either expressly
or impliedly, of all parties and all issues in the case. Trammell v.
Rosen, 106 Tex. 132, 157 S.W. 1161 (1913); Wooters v. Kaufman,
67 Tex. 488, 3 S.W. 465 (1887); Duke v. Gilbreath, 2 S.W.2d 324
(Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error dism. Otherwise, the court's order is
interlocutory. Henderson v. Shell Oil Co., 143 Tex. 142, 182 S.W.2d
994 (1944); Witt v. Witt, 205 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
Where a motion for summary judgment is filed and denied, an
appellate court is without jurisdiction because the order is not a final
judgment. Wright v. Wright, 154 Tex. 138, 274 S.W.2d 670
(1955); Bell v. Davis, 287 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956);
City of San Antonio v. Crane, 275 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.
1955). However, if both parties file motions for summary judgment
on the entire case and one is wholly granted, this order is a final
judgment and appealable, and the appellate court can consider the
granting of one summary judgment and the denial of the other and
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fully dispose of both on appeal. Tobin v. Garcia, - Tex. -, 316
S.W.2d 396 (1958), expressly overruling Rogers v. Royalty Pooling
Co., -Tex. -, 302 S.W.2d 938 (1957) and impliedly overruling
A.A.A. Realty Co. v. Neece, 292 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957),
aff'd on other grounds, -Tex.-, 299 S.W.2d 270 (1957). Contrasted with the problem presented when a motion for summary
judgment is denied, an order granting a motion for summary judgment on the entire case is final and appealable. Tobin v. Garcia, supra;
Rogers v. Royalty Pooling Co., supra; A.A.A. Realty Co. v. Neece,
supra. However, the principal case presents a fact situation concerning which there is a split of authority in Texas, viz., whether the
granting of a summary judgment on a severable portion of a case is
final and appealable. (If the portion of a case on which summary
judgment is granted is actually severed from the remaining issues
and parties, an appeal from the severed portion is allowed. See TEX.
R. Civ. P. ANN. 41, 174 (1955); cf. Gallaher v. City Transp. Co.,
262 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref.; Sterett v. Dyer,
230 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error ref. See also Womack.
v. Berry,-Tex.-, 291 S.W.2d 677 (1956).) Where the summary
judgment does not dispose of all parties, some cases allow an appeal
where the cause of action is "severable" and the interests of the
parties not appealing are unaffected. See Bateman v. Carter-Jones
Drilling Co., 290 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref.,
n.r.e.; Richards v. Smith, 239 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951)

error ref. n.r.e.; cf. Riggs v. Bartlett, 310 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1957) error ref. n.r.e. (an independent severable cause of action should be appealed from the date of the summary judgment,
even though there has been no actual severance). Other cases reject
the doctrine of implied severance and hold such judgments not appealable. See McCormack v. Morgan, 306 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1957); Myers v. Smitherman, 279 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App.
1955); Dunn v. Tillman, 271 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954);

Gallaher v. City Transp. Co., supra; Maxfield v. Dunagan, 254
S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). If an order grants a motion for
summary judgment on a portion of the issues, most cases hold the
order interlocutory and not appealable. See Bryant v. City of Austin,
290 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.; City of San
Antonio v. Castillo, 285 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error
ref.; Minchen v. Murrah, 285 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955);
Panas v. State, 244 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951). See also
C. & L. Supply Co. v. Kennerly, 258 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App.
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1951); Moran v. Midland Farms Co., 282 S.W. 608 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926); Moran v. Midland Farms Co., 282 S.W. 611 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926.) However, the Texas Supreme Court allowed the appeal of
an order granting a summary judgment on a portion of a case on
the theory that such portion was severable. Wright v. Wright, supra;
see Harred v. Conrad, 287 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error
ref. n.r.e.
The principal case, rejecting the doctrine of implied severance,
holds that a summary judgment on less than the complete case is
appealable only if there is actual severance. The facts limit the
holding to a situation where the issues between two parties are severable rather than where the interests of some parties are severable
from those of other parties in the suit. However, the reasoning of
the case is applicable in either situation. The opinion does not provide an elaborate explanation of the court's rejection of the impliedseverance doctrine, but seems to conclude that cases accepting such
a doctrine are so plainly erroneous as to merit no explanation. See
Myers v. Smitherman, supra. Thus, while the court in the principal
case explicitly follows the law in Texas, those cases accepting the
doctrine of implied severance also purport to follow the Texas law
by saying that when the interests in the case are severable, they
should be treated as severed. See, e.g., Richards v. Smith, supra. The
main inquiry becomes, therefore, whether or not there can be severance by implication simply because the issues or parties are severable.
Such a doctrine appears to be a unique doctrine brought forth by
the relatively new practice of summary judgments. It is clearly used
to circumvent the "final judgment" requirement, and the cases have
found it sufficient to say that severance can be implied. See, e.g.,

Riggs v. Bartlett, supra.
If the doctrine of implied severance is reaffirmed by the Texas
Supreme Court (as was its position in Wright v. Wright, supra),
two important considerations arise: (1) determining the criteria for
deciding when a summary judgment on a portion of the case is
severable, and (2) deciding whether an appeal from such a severable summary judgment is permissive or mandatory. Both problems
lead to substantial uncertainy. Following the rule of Riggs v. Bartlett, supra, (the right of appeal as to a severable summary judgment
is lost unless prosecuted from the date of rendering the summary
judgment) the only safe procedure, in order to avoid a ruling that
an appeal is not timely, is to appeal from all partial summary judgments which are severable, even though there is a strong possibility
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of dismissal in some circuits. In the alternative, the party wishing to
appeal can seek actual severance of the case, although this necessitates
two trials if the appeal is successful. Left unanswered, except in the
most clear-cut cases, is the question of when a partial summary
judgment is in fact severable. It would seem that the Texas Supreme
Court should accept an appropriate case so as to furnish attorneys
with a clear statement as to the nature of a severable action, thus
relieving them of the burden of prosecuting useless appeals; a survey
of the cases reveals that the lower courts are in hopeless disagreement
on this point. Although it appears that the unique doctrine of implied severance offers flexibility to the rules of appealable judgments,
its present uncertainty by far outweighs its benefits. Accordingly, the
practical validity of the present court's rejection of this doctrine
seems indisputable. The Supreme Court might do well to follow this
example and thus overrule Wright v. Wright, supra.

Edward Copley, Jr.

Securities Regulation - Offers Press Release

Pre-filing

Arvida Corporation was formed to develop certain Florida real
estate. Prior to filing a registration statement with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the underwriters issued a press release presenting an exceedingly favorable picture regarding the value of the
enterprise but omitting material information (later disclosed in the
registration statement) regarding capitalization, indebtedness, operating plans, and the quality of the land. The release further stated
that stock would soon be offered to the public at a named price.
Within a short time a considerable amount of interest was expressed
by the investment community. The SEC instituted proceedings to
determine whether or not to revoke the underwriters' listing as a
broker and suspend or expel the firm from membership in the National Association of Securities Dealers. Held: A press release concerning securities which emanates from a broker prior to the filing
of the registration statement must be presumed to set in motion the
distribution process and involve an offer within the meaning of the
Securities Act of 1933. (Although such an offer constituted a willful
violation of the Securities Act, the Commission concluded that no
action against the parties was necessary in view of the underwriters'
good faith reliance on advice of counsel, their commendable reputation, and the lack of injury to the public.) Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades
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& Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5870, Feb. 9,
1959, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 76,635.

The Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa
77a-77aa
(1952), as amended, 68 Stat. 683 (1954), 15 U.S.C.A.
to
is
designed
Act),
(Supp. 1959) ( hereinafter cited as Securities
information
pertinent
of
disclosure
protect investors by requiring
regarding securities which are being distributed. SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). The act applies to securities offered through the channels of interstate commerce or the mails,
Securities Act § 5, although certain securities and transactions are
exempted, Securities Act §§ 3-4; Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
351-411 (1951, Supp. 1955). Section 5, the fundamental provision
of the act, is designed to secure accomplishment of the act's purpose
through the use of two forms: (1) a registration statement which
contains essential information about the security and which must be
filed with the SEC, Securities Act §§ 2 (8), 6-7, and (2) a prospectus, based on information in the registration statement, which must
be furnished to prospective investors, Securities Act §§ 2(10), 10.
Loss, op. cit. supra (Supp. 1955, at 32). Only after the effective
date of the registration statement (normally twenty days after the
filing of the registration statement unless the SEC delays the effective
date by intervention) may sales be consummated or deliveries made,
although a full prospectus must be used. Forer, A Comment on the
Amendments to the Federal Securities Acts, 103 U. PA. L. REv.
1020, 1032-34 (1955). While the registration statement is being
processed during the waiting period (after filing, but before the effective date), the regulations are even more stringent, and the
offeror may make only limited solicitations of offers to buy. See
Loss, op. cit. supra (Supp. 1955, at 66-79). However, before the
registration statement is filed, offers (and sales) are absolutely prohibited, although there may be preliminary negotiations between
issuers and underwriters. Loss, op. cit. supra (Supp. 1955, at 62-66).
If such prohibited offers are made, the offeror will be subject to
sanctions imposed under the Securities Act, §§ 11-12, 20, 24, and,
if he is a broker-dealer, to those imposed under the Securities Exchange Actof 1934, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b), 780-3 (b) (4),
78o-3(1) (1952).
The SEC does not purport to approve or disapprove the investment value of a security as the philosophy embodied in the act is one

of disclosure. A. C. Frost &qCo. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312
U.S. 38 (1941); Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975 (D.C. Pa.
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1951); SEC Securities Act Release No. 1, May 27, 1933. Accordingly, the theory underlying section 5 is strict control of dissemination of information regarding securities so that issuers will be cautious in offering a security and so that investors may be capable of
making intelligent decisions. See Otis & Co. v. SEC, 106 F.2d 579
(6th Cir. 1939); Loss, op. cit. supra (Supp. 1955, at 36-37);
MCCORMICK, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES ACT AND THE S.E.C.
298-305 (1948). Pursuant to this objective, the primary activity
during the waiting period is the SEC staff's examination of the registration statement and consultation with the issuer to obtain adequacy of disclosure. See Loss, op. cit. supra at 166-203. However,
when material is released prior to the filing date, the opportunity
to scrutinize the information or correct any deficiencies is not afforded the SEC, and the Commission must resort to employment
of section 5 to remedy violations of pre-filing prohibitions. Thus the
definition of "offer" becomes of crucial significance both to the SEC
which employs the term to accommodate its purpose of disclosure,
and to the issuer who must avoid making a prohibited offer. "Offer"
is defined to include "every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security for value." Securities Act § 2 (3).
The stated policy of the SEC is to interpret the term "offer" to include any matter which is designed to procure or encourage offers
to buy. SEC Securities Act Release No. 2623, July 25, 1941. Further,
pre-filing publicity efforts which "contribute to conditioning the
public mind or arousing the public interest" are offers, even though
not couched in terms of express offers. SEC Securities Act Release
No. 3844, Oct. 8, 1957. Contrasted with the statements of the SEC,
case law on the definition of offer is meager. Prior to 1954 the definition of "sale" included the definition of offer, 48 Stat. 74 (1933),
15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1952), and the cases focused on defining
sale, see, e.g., Bogy v. United States, 96 F.2d 734 (6th Cir. 1938);
United States v. Monjar, 47 F. Supp. 421 (D.C. Del. 1942). Nonetheless it is clear from a reading of these cases that the term sale
should be construed broadly. However, the principal case is the first,
before or after 1954, to concentrate upon the meaning of offer and
give this particular term an expansive constructon.
Acknowledging the direction of Congress to pursue a vigorous
enforcement policy, S. Rep. No. 1036, 83d Cong. 2d Sess.
p. 2 (1954), the SEC in the principal case by relying on SEC
Securities Act Release No. 3844, Oct. 8, 1957, gives the word
"offer" a vast sweep. The Commission sets forth the principle that
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publicity in the form of a press release which originates from the
underwriters must be presumed to set in motion the distribution
process, and thus constitute an offer. The decisive factors which led
the Commission to the expansive definition were threefold: (1) the
deliberate planning and placing of the news release by an underwriter; (2) the disparity of information in the press release and
the registration statement; and (3) the generation of considerable
interest in the investment community. Further, it was reasoned that
the "news value" of the proposed endeavor, instead of providing
mitigation, strengthened the presumption of an offer because a
highly appealing news item stimulates the appetite of the investment
world. These factors taken cumulatively led to the conclusion that
a broad definition of offer is necessary to prevent circumvention of
the policies of the Securities Act regarding disclosure. Accordingly,
the definition of offer is based not on strict legal maxims, but on
policy considerations deemed necessary to protect the investing public. Cf. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., supra.
The Securities Act does not limit its pre-filing prohibitions to offers in the contract sense; it recognizes, and bars, the informal commitments by which much of modern business is conducted. In
the principal case, the SEC, equally realistically, recognizes the effectiveness of modern communication media, particularly against
the background of informal commitments common to the securities trade. Here, a press release reaching an equity-hungry public
probably was relied on and was certainly acted upon although it
contained material omissions. Therefore, the aim of disclosure by
issuers before investors are committed was defeated as thoroughly
as by an inadequate written offer privately delivered. Although the
result might have been different in the absence of the three factors
enumerated above, the case leaves no clear guide to determine when
a press release will constitute an offer. The case does, however, leave
one distinct impression: all doubts will be resolved against the
offeror. Thus the holding of the case is a caveat that the SEC will
administer the act in the light of practices common to the investment world.
Edward Copley, Jr.
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Escape of Deleterious Substances
Joint and Several Liability

P's land was damaged by salt water which escaped from D's oil
operations and from oil activities conducted by two other persons.
In an action against D, it was determined that damages could not
be apportioned between D and the other two with reasonable certainty. D was found negligent, but no finding was made as to the
possible negligence of the other two who contributed to the total
damage. Held: When two or more persons commit independent acts
which join to produce an injury which is not reasonably apportionable, one actor may be held liable for the entire damage when he
alone is sued and shown to have been negligent. Burns v. Lamb, 312
S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e.
As a general rule, a defendant is liable only for that damage which
he in fact causes. Scott v. Gardner, 159 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App.
1942) error ref. n.r.e.; 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1108 (1956).
However, where two or more causes produce an injury, the defendant responsible for one cause may be held liable in given circumstances for the entire harm. PROSSER, TORTS 224 (2d ed. 1955).
Full liability has been imposed where two or more persons act in
concert, Bobich v. Dac/kdow, 229 Ky. 830, 18 S.W.2d 280 (1929);
Wrabek v. Suchomel, 145 Minn. 468, 117 N.W. 764 (1920), where
two or more defendants violate a similar duty in producing the injury, Simmons v. Emerson, 124 N.Y. 319, 26 N.E. 911 (1891);
Johnson v. Chapman, 43 W. Va. 639, 28 S.E. 744 (1897), and
when two or more causes combine to produce an injury humanly
incapable of apportionment, Baylor v. Bradshaw, 52 S.W.2d 1094
(Tex. Civ. App. 1938), aff'd, 126 Tex. 99, 84 S.W.2d 703 (1935),
e.g., death, PROSSER, op. cit. supra at 224. When the damage theoretically is apportionable (e.g., escaping salt water injuring land),
but the jury cannot discern the damage attributable to each act, the
majority rule denies recovery altogether on the theory that plaintiff
has failed to prove the causation of each defendant. Farley v. Crystal
Coal & Coke Co., 85 W. Va. 595, 102 S.E. 265 (1920); Note, 31
N.C.L. REv. 237 (1953); see Annot., 39 A.L.R. 908 (1922). Although Texas formerly accepted this view, Sun Oil Co. v. Robicheaux, 23 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930); Tucker Oil Co.
v. Matthews, 119 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), the Texas Supreme Court has declared that where the "tortious acts of two or
more wrongdoers join to produce an indivisible injury, that is, an injury which from its nature cannot be apportioned with reasonable
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certainty to the individual wrongdoers, all will be held jointly and severally liable for the entire damage," Landers v. East Texas Salt Water
Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1953); accord, Phillips Pet. Co. v. Hardee, 189 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1951); Polzin v.
National Co-op Refinery Ass'n, 175 Kan. 531, 266 P.2d 293 (1954);
PrairieOil & Gas Co. v. Laskey, 173 Okla. 48, 46 P.2d 484 (1935).
The policy behind the Landers case is to avoid the undesirable
situation where the plaintiff is without a remedy simply because he
is unable to prove the extent of causation to be attributed to each
of one or more defendants. See Wigmore, Joint-Tortfeasors and
Severance of Damages, 17 ILL. L. REV. 458 (1923). Thus, in this
context, the rule of the Landers case may be ". . . that where two
or more defendants are shown to be at fault and to have caused each
some damage, and only the extent is in question, the burden of
proof . . . [shifts] to the defendants, and each . . . [shall] be held
liable to the extent that he cannot limit his responsibility." PROSSER,
op. cit. supra at 229; see Jackson, Joint Tort and Several Liability,
17 TEXAS L. REV. 399 (1939); cf. Finnegan v. Royalty Realty Co.,
35 Cal. 2d 409, 433, 218 P.2d 17, 32 (1950). Consequently, if
one defendant proves that he caused a given percentage of the total
damage, his liability will be limited accordingly. If he fails to prove
the extent of causation attributable to his acts, he will be jointly
and severally liable with the other defendants. However, is it permissible to impose entire liability under the Landers rule when no
finding of wrongdoing has been made by the jury as to the acts of
those other than the defendant who contributed to the total injury?
P contended that the Landers rule was simply inapplicable since
there was no finding that the other persons contributing to the injury (who were not parties to the present action) were negligent or
intentional wrongdoers. This contention, i.e., that "tortious acts of
two or more wrongdoers," as expressed in the Landers case, is required before the rule of that case is applicable, was not disputed;
however, the court construed the facts of the instant case as coming within the rule. The court reasoned (1) that "tortious" includes
not only negligent and intentional acts but also acts which may be
described as acts where strict liability is imposed, and (2) that the
acts of these other persons causing injury to P were acts of strict
liability since " . . . it is one's duty not to make such use of his own
property as will injure that of his neighbor; and he is liable at all
events for the consequences if he violates that duty." The first
proposition is sound; however, the court's second point is supported
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only by authority from jurisdictions which follow Rylands v.
Fletcher, [1868] 3 H.L. 330. This, it is believed, is unsound since
the Supreme Court of Texas has expressly rejected the strict liability
doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, supra, for the escape of deleterious
substances and has demanded a showing of negligence. Turner v.
Big Lake Oil Company, 128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d 221 (1936).
Accord, Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin, 153 Tex. 465, 271
S.W.2d 410 (1954); see Jones, Escape of Deleterious Substances:
Strict Liability v. Liability Based Upon Fault, 1 ROCKY MT. MIN. L.
INST. 163 (1955). Thus, the present court avoided the problem that

might have arisen if the conduct of the other persons contributing
to the indivisible injury were not considered tortious. As this error
seems patent, an inquiry into the refusal of review by the Supreme
Court seems proper. It is believed the Court probably felt that
for the rule of the Landers case to be applied, all persons contributing to the injury must be wrongdoers, but that a defendant must
raise the issue in the nature of an affirmative defense, which apparently he failed to do. There may be other alternatives for this action.
The Supreme Court may have felt that the other persons contributing to the injury were erroneously categorized "wrongdoers" by the
court of civil appeals, but that this is immaterial. Such reasoning
would, of course, be inconsistent with the literal Landers rule and
would impliedly overrule its requirement that all persons who contributed to the injury be wrongdoers guilty of tortious conduct.
Finally, it might be conjectured that the Supreme Court approved
the application of the Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine only where necessary to complete the requirements of the Landers rule. It should be
pointed out that in the Landers case total liability was imposed
when all the persons causing injury were made defendants. Thus,
although the Court in that case said " . . . the injured party may
proceed to judgment against any one separately . . .," 248 S.W.2d

at 734, that language was dictum. This case then supports the
Landers dictum, for here only one actor was sued and held liable
for all the damages (although all the actors were made defendants
in the Landers case). The seeming harshness of this rule can be
prevented by the defendant joining the other responsible parties,
TEx. R. Civ. P. ANN. 38 (1941), thus entitling the defendant
to contribution, Union Bus Lines v. Byrd, 142 Tex. 257, 177 S.W.2d
774 (1942).
It is regrettable that the court of civil appeals failed to recognize the law of Texas, as reflected in Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co.,
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supra, in its application of the Landers rule. It remains unanswered
what results will follow when some of the damage is caused by persons who are completely innocent. If, though, assuming that
Rylands v. Fletcher is still not accepted in Texas, we may accept the refusal of the Supreme Court to review the case as an
indication that it is not necessary that the damage be caused by
"tortious acts of two or more wrongdoers," the plaintiff will be
given a much easier case in holding one wrongdoer for damages
which P could not recover in direct litigation against such persons.
Because of the failure of the Supreme Court to delve into the many
unanswered problems of joint liability as presented by the present
facts, the case leaves us little in the way of determinative authority.
The strongest point is that total liability may be imposed against
one tortfeasor who joins with other persons (be they innocent or
otherwise) to produce an indivisible injury, without the joinder of
those other persons.

Gene L. McCoy

Torts

-

Wrongful Death - Community Property
Defense

A father and his minor son were killed in an automobile-train

collision in which the father was contributorily negligent. The
father died instantaneously; the son died approximately one hour
after the accident. The mother brought suit for the loss of services
of the minor son under the Texas Wrongful Death Act.

Held:

Where the cause of action for wrongful death of a minor child
accrues after the death of a contributorily negligent spouse, the community property defense is inapplicable to bar recovery by the surving spouse. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. Hamilton, 314 S.W.2d
114 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e.

Under Texas law, a cause of action is property, Ezell v. Dodson,
60 Tex. 331 (1883), and damages recovered for negligently inflicted

injuries to one spouse are the community property of both, McAdams
v. Dallas Ry. &q Terminal Co., 149 Tex. 217, 229 S.W.2d 1012
(1950); Northern Texas Traction Co. v. Hill, 297 S.W. 778 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1927) error ref. Thus, one spouse may not recover for
personal injuries resulting from the combined wrongful conduct of
the other spouse and a third person on the theory that, as community owner, the other spouse would be profiting by his own
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wrong (commonly termed the community property defense). Garrett v. Reno Oil Co., 271 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error
ref. n.r.e.; Bostick v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 81 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1935) error dism.; see Welch v. Baiter, 186 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.
1951) (an extreme application of this doctrine).
To recover under the Texas Wrongful Death Act, the party
bringing the action must prove that the deceased could have recovered for personal injuries had he lived. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 4672 (1952), Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan,
124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935); Sullivan-Sanford Lumber Co.
v. Watson, 106 Tex. 4, 155 S.W. 179 (1913). Thus, in an action
for the wife's wrongful death caused in part by the contributory
negligence of the husband, all beneficiaries of the wife are barred
from recovery (even if the husband is also killed) because, had the
wife lived, recovery for personal injuries would be community
property, and the husband, or his heirs, would thereby profit by
his wrong. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. High, 128 Tex. 219, 103
S.W.2d 735 (1937). Where the suit is based upon the death of a
minor child, the statutory test is satisfied since the negligence of a
parent is not imputed to a child, Kuemmel v. Vradenburg, 239
S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref. n.r.e.; therefore, the
child, had he lived, could recover for his personal injuries, Moss v.
Rishworth, 222 S.W. 225 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920). However, in
a suit brought by a contributorily negligent parent for the wrongful
death of a minor child, such parent is barred from recovery by his
own wrong, and the other parent, under the theory of one federal
case, also is barred because recovery would be community property,
thereby unjustly enriching the contributorily negligent parent. Baker
v. Dallas Hotel Co., 73 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1934). Thus, according
to that court, the community property defense may be superimposed
upon the statutory test to defeat a claim for the wrongful death of
a child even though the statute, standing alone, would permit recovery. Green, The Texas Death Act, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 460, 46364 (1948).
The court in the principal case reasoned that the community
property defense is inapplicable to its facts because the death of the
husband terminated the community, i.e., the cause of action for the
death of the son arose after (one hour) the husband's death; consequently, the recovery would be the widow's separate property. 314
S.W.2d at 117. Since the only test required by the statute is to prove
that the deceased could have recovered had he lived, Sullivan-Sanford
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Lumber Co. v. Watson, supra, it would seem that the negligence of
the person bringing the action would be irrelevant, e.g., where a
contributorily negligent parent sued for the wrongful death of his
child, Green, supra at 462. Contra, Baker v. Dallas Hotel Co., supra.
Thus, it may be questioned whether the court in the principal case
should have considered the community property defense since the
statutory test sanctions the present action (i.e., the child could have
recovered). Moss v. Risbworth, supra. Such consideration apparently is based on the assumption that there is more than one test to be
applied in determining recovery in a wrongful death action. Cf.
Baker v. Dallas Hotel Co., supra. While this is the first Texas case
in which the community property defense has been considered in an
action for the wrongful death of a child, the court's emphasis on the
time sequence of events may at least modify the application of the
defense in other cases. In Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. High, supra,
(the leading Texas Supreme Court case in this field) both spouses
were killed, and the Court held all beneficiaries of the innocent
spouse were barred from recovery. If the Court had adopted a
time-sequence analysis, recovery would depend upon which spouse
died first. For example, if the action were for the death of a wife,
and the husband were contributorily negligent, the beneficiaries
could recover notwithstanding the community property defense if
she were the last to die, because had she lived, recovery for personal
injuries would be her separate property. Cf. Nickerson v. Nickerson,
65 Tex. 281 (1886). However, if the wife (or child as in the instant case) were the first to die, recovery would be denied, even
though the father actually is dead. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v.
High, supra; see generally, Green, supra.
It is apparent that the policy underlying the community property
defense is to prevent unjust enrichment of a wrongdoer. It would
seem, therefore, that the defense should not apply to wrongful death
actions where the contributorily negligent spouse, or his heirs, cannot be enriched by his wrong. Assuming the applicability of this
theory, the decision in the High case is not necessarily incorrect, but
the Court should have considered the time sequence of death in its
analysis of the facts before it. If the court in the principal case had
denied recovery, the refusal by the Supreme Court to hear the case
would be meaningless. However, inasmuch as recovery was permitted to stand in the principal case, there is a strong argument that
the Supreme Court sanctions the unjust enrichment theory. Accordingly, the rule may be that the community property defense is
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applicable only where there is a possibility that the negligent spouse,
or his heirs, may be unjustly enriched. Such enrichment will never
occur when the innocent spouse (or child) dies after the wrongdoer.
Larry L. Bean

Wills -

Life Beneficiary and Remaindermen
Stock Dividends

-

P received a life interest in the stock of a corporation by the terms
of her husband's will. Subsequent to the creation of this interest a
one hundred per cent stock dividend was declared. P brought suit to
determine her interest in the stock dividend. Held: An extraordinary
stock dividend belongs to corpus and not income. Bergin v. Bergin,
-Tex.-, 315 S.W.2d 943 (1958).
When the ownership of property consists of life estates and remainders, the general rule is that the life beneficiaries are entitled to
the income from the property, and the remaindermen are entitled
only to the corpus. Hobson v. Shelton, 302 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1957) error ref. n.r.e.; Bailey v. Bailey, 212 S.W.2d 189 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1948) error ref.; Medlin v. Medlin, 203 S.W.2d 635 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947) error ref. In regard to extraordinary dividend
declarations, the character of which depend upon the regularity, size,
frequency, and source of the dividend, RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 236
(1935), special problems arise when the property consists of stock in
a corporation. Of course, when the interests are created under a will,
the testator may direct to whom these dividends should be paid. In re
Matthews' Trust, 280 App. Div. 23, 111 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1952),
aff'd without opinion, 305 N.Y. 605, 111 N.E.2d 731 (1952); In re
Lloyd's Estate, 292 N.Y. 280, 54 N.E.2d 825 (1944). In the absence
of an expressed intent, there are three general rules in the United
States dealing with extraordinary dividend declarations. Note, 8 U.
MIAMI L.Q. 646 (1954); Comment, 10 TEXAS L. REV. 75 (1932).
The "Kentucky Rule" awards all distributions from earnings to income without regard to its character as a cash or stock dividend. Laurent v. Randolf, 306 Ky. 134, 206 S.W.2d 840 (1947) ; Hite v. Hite,
93 Ky. 257, 20 S.W. 778 (1892). The "Pennsylvania Rule" also rejects the character of the dividend (cash or stock) as the exclusive
criterion and attempts an apportionment by giving to income any
amount which represents earnings after the creation of the life interest, but, at the same time, preserves the "intact value." In re King's
Estate, 349 Pa. 27, 36 A.2d 504 (1944); Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368
(1857). The "intact value" is the book value of the stock at the com-
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mencement of the life interest and includes all undistributed corporate earnings accumulated prior to the creation of the life interest. In
re Bard's Estate, 339 Pa. 433, 13 A.2d 711 (1940); Earp's Appeal,

supra. The "Massachusetts Rule" gives the entire extraordinary distribution from earnings to the remaindermen if it is a stock dividend,
and to the life beneficiary if it is a cash dividend, without inquiring
in either case whether the earnings which the dividend represents accrued before or after the commencement of the life interest. Bowles
v. Stilley's Ex'r., 267 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954) (committing
Kentucky to the Massachusetts Rule) ; In re Heard's Estate, 107 Cal.
App.2d 225, 236 P.2d 810 (1951); Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101
(1868). All three rules recognize that any dividend representing a
distribution of the capital assets of the corporation, as distinguished
from accumulated earnings, is to be given to the remaindermen.
Comment, 10 TEXAS L. REv. 75 (1932); cf. Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d
1277 (1955).
The basic theory of the "Massachusetts Rule" is that a stock dividend is not in any true sense a dividend at all because (at least
theoretically) it represents no more than a "paper" change in the
proportionate interests of the respective stockholders. Bowles v.

Stilley's Ex'r., supra; accord, Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S. 549
(1890). To some extent it relieves the courts and administrators of
the burden of investigating the affairs of the corporation in an effort
to determine the period over which the dividends have accumulated.
Minot v. Paine, supra; Comment, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 616 (1931).
However, it does not obviate the necessity of a determination of the
source of the dividend, viz., accumulated earnings or capital assets,
Comment, 10 TEXAS L. REv. 75 (1931), or a dividend in the form
of stock in another corporation. Comment, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 616
(1931). Under the "Massachusetts Rule" the latter is treated as a
cash dividend. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Jameson, 256 Mass. 179, 152
N.E. 52 (1926); Gray v. Hemenway, 212 Mass. 239, 98 N.E. 789
(1912). This emphasis on the character of the dividend (cash or
stock) as the exclusive criterion of the respective rights of the life
beneficiary or remaindermen may work hardship on the life beneficiary, since a stock dividend has the effect of taking accumulated
earnings out of an earnings or income account and adding them to
fixed capital which diminishes the possibility of a cash dividend being
declared out of earnings. In re Whitacre's Will, 208 Minn. 286, 293
N.W. 784 (1940); cf. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 481-83 (rev.
ed. 1946).
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The Court in the principal case rejected the "Pennsylvania Rule"
on the ground that it placed too great a burden on the administrators
and courts because it requires an investigation into the affairs of the
corporation to determine the period over which the dividend has accumulated and the "intact value" of the stock at the time the life
interest was created. 315 S.W.2d at 948. However, in the light of
modern corporate statutes which often provide for partial dividend
distributions out of sources other than earnings, see, e.g., TEX. Bus.
CORP. ACT. art. 2.38-2.40 (1958), the Court apparently ignores the
hardships imposed on all interests, including remaindermen, by a
strict application of the "Massachusetts Rule." (1) The entire
amount of an extraordinary cash dividend, declared during the life
interest but from earnings accumulated wholly before its commencement, goes to the life beneficiary under the "Massachusetts Rule,"
Bowles v. Stilley's Ex'r., supra; In re Hurd's Estate, supra; Minot v.
Paine, supra; thus, the life beneficiary in this situation receives dividends which were accumulated prior to any interest he acquired;
(2) a stock dividend declared during the life interest, which was
earned wholly during the life interest, goes in its entirety to the
remaindermen. Bowles v. Stilley's Ex'r., supra; Minot v. Paine, supra.
Under the "Pennsylvania Rule," an apportionment would be effected,
and any increase in the book value of the stock since the creation of
the life interest would go to the life beneficiary. In re King's Estate,
supra; Earp's Appeal, supra; Comment, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 616
(1931).
The principal reason the Court in the instant case gave for
adopting the "Massachusetts Rule" was its simplicity of application.
'When balanced with the equities of the "Pennsylvania Rule," this
seems to be an inadequate basis for the adoption of the "Massachusetts Rule." Since both rules recognize that any dividend distribution
from capital belongs to the remaindermen, and since modern
corporate statutes often provide for dividend distributions from
sources other than earnings, the Court ignores the reality that practically every extraordinary dividend distribution will require an investigation into the affairs of the corporation. Thus, because the
"Pennsylvania Rule" attempts to apportion the earnings between the
life beneficiary and remaindermen as they accrue and at the same
time preserve the "intact value" of the stock, it would seem to be the
more desirable rule.
James G. Gregory

